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Mayflower Hotel
Washington, D.C.

* Editor's Note: This panel discussion took place in 2014, prior to the passing of
Justice Antonin Scalia. Justice Scalia's impact on the development of administrative
law in the United States is unparalleled.
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JUSTICE DON WILLETT: Good afternoon, everybody. I'm
Don Willett. I'm honored to join you from Austin, Texas. It's not
often you get to fly from one nation's capital to another, so I'm
honored to join you.
[Laughter.]

JUSTICE DON WILLETT: As I was leaving for the airport
yesterday, my 5-year-old daughter, Genevieve, whined, "Daddy,
where are you going? Daddy, what are people going to be talking
about?" And I knelt down, and I looked her in the eye, and I gently
asked her, "Genevieve, baby, do you think it's time to revisit
Chevron deference?"
[Laughter.]
JUSTICE DON WILLETT: And her big green eyes widened,
and she grabbed my leg really tight, and she answered, "Daddy, do
we have any bacon?"
[Laughter.]
JUSTICE DON WILLETT: Genevieve is a smart little girl,
because Chevron deference is kind of like bacon. Some people like
their Chevron deference rigid and crisp. Other people like it a
little squishy and a little bendable. A few people dislike it
altogether, no matter how it's served. But Chevron' is now thirty
years old, older than a number of people in the audience today,
and a lot has changed. The regulatory state has exploded, in terms
of size and scope, over the last thirty years, becoming arguably a
fourth branch of government altogether.
So, is it time to revisit and think anew about judicial
deference to agency decision-making? Do Chevron's virtues
outweigh the vices? Have courts gone too far? Has Chevron
deference devolved into Chevron dereliction? Are courts moving
increasingly from adjudication to abdication, letting the foxes
guard the agency henhouse? So it is a thorny question that vexes
the Court, and not along the usual ideological lines. We have three
1 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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former administrative law professors on the U.S. Supreme Court.
They have very fervent, strongly held views on Chevron and
Chevron deference. And the Court is going to have, undeniably,
some pretty high-profile opportunities in the near term, I believe,
to revisit and possibly recalibrate Chevron.
Our four impressive panelists are going to help untangle all
of this. I'll keep the introductions mercifully short. They'll each
speak for about 10 to 12 minutes, either where they are or at the
podium, whatever they prefer, and then we'll have an opportunity
for some intrapanel rebuttal. And then we'll open it up, as we
always do, for audience Q&A. The microphone-it's kind of hard to
see with that bright light-is in the middle of the ballroom, right
there, so please go there, and not just stand up, so we can get you
recorded.
Batting lead-off, on my right, Professor Amy Wildermuth,
Professor of Law at the University of Utah, where she teaches and
writes on civil procedure, administrative law, U.S. Supreme Court
practice. She has more degrees than a thermometer, I think.
[Laughter.]

&

JUSTICE DON WILLETT: She has an AB in history and a
BS in engineering and policy from Washington University in St.
Louis, an MS in environmental engineering, and then, finally, a
law degree from the University of Illinois. So four degrees and
three clerkships. She clerked for Judge Calabresi on the Second
Circuit, Judge Edwards on the D.C. Circuit, and, finally, for
Justice Stevens on the U.S. Supreme Court.
To her left is Charles Cooper, a familiar face to a lot of us
here, founding member of the Washington D.C. law firm Cooper
Kirk, named by the National Law Journal as one of the ten best
civil litigators in Washington. Over thirty years of legal experience
in government and private practice, with several appearances
before the U.S. Supreme Court. Chuck was a law clerk to Judge
Paul Roney of the Fifth Circuit, now the Eleventh Circuit-this
was pre-split-and then for then-Justice Rehnquist on the U.S.
Supreme Court, and then went to the Justice Department in the
Civil Rights Division, and then, in '85, President Reagan
appointed him to head up to the Office of Legal Counsel there at
DOJ. Chuck's trial and appellate practice is national in scope. It
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really covers the entire gamut. It is concentrated a bit in the areas
of constitutional law, commercial law, administrative law, health
care, and civil rights litigation.
Third, Professor Jack Beermann, Professor of Law at Boston
University School of Law, which he joined the year Chevron was
decided, in 1984. Professor Beermann clerked for Judgepronounce this for me.
JACK BEERMANN: Which part of Wisconsin are you from?
JUSTICE DON WILLETT: I'm from deep south Wisconsin,
as in Texas-Cudahy of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit; co-author of, at least, by my count, four books on
administrative law, including a widely used leading case book,
and, to the joy of a lot of law students, the Emanuel Law Outline
for administrative law. He's been published virtually everywhere,
not just in America but all over the globe, on administrative law,
on civil rights. He's lectured in numerous countries throughout
the world. But in his spare time, he does umpire high school and
youth baseball games, where, no doubt, the fans give you
unlimited deference, I'm sure, right? No second guessing at all.
Finally, Professor Thomas Merrill, the Charles Evans
Hughes Professor of Law at Columbia Law School. Before that he
was on the faculty at Northwestern and Yale Law Schools. A
former deputy solicitor general from '87 to '90. He has taught
administrative law for many, many years, and written extensively
about the Chevron doctrine, among other topics.
So, Professor Wildermuth, if you want to start, you can stay
where you are or come up here. I defer.
AMY WILDERMUTH: Thank you so much. It is great to be
on this terrific panel, and I have to say, after a long flight from
Utah, that I got off of about an hour ago, it's nice to stand, so I am
going to stand for a little bit.
My job, I think, is to set the stage here for this panel. It's a
little interesting because my most recent work is on Auer
deference, which is going to come up in just a second. I'm going to
try to tie all the deference doctrines together. But as any good
administrative law professor will do, we should start by sort of
setting the stage and talking about all the deference doctrines.
Before I talk about that, I think what will be important to take
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away from what I have learned is the historical background that I
think we sometimes skip over when thinking about these
doctrines, so that's where I'm going to come back to, and I am
going to give you a little hint to where we're going to end up here.
It concerns me. It deeply troubles me, from what I have
discovered.
So here is the brief review first. When I teach this, where you
talk about the five deference doctrines in administrative law, two
of which we get out of the APA, the arbitrary and capricious
standard and the substantial evidence standard, I'm going to set
those to the side for right now and I'm really going to talk about
the three judicially created deference doctrines-the Chevron
doctrine, the Skidmore doctrine, and Auer.
Chevron, we all know, is the deference that's afforded to
interpretations of statutes that have the force of law. I'll spend a
little bit more time on that in just a second, but we all know this is
the Chevron two-step, and I would presume that you would not all
be here if we didn't remember what that two-step was. I usually
do a dance right now, in my class, the two-step. No? Okay.
So, how about Skidmore? The recently revived, although not
so recent now, Skidmore doctrine, which applies to interpretations
of statutes that don't have the force of law, and just so we all
remember, it's a sliding scale of deference here. It's determined by
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning-this is the interpretation-its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it the
power to persuade.
And then, finally in this constellation, we have Auer
deference, which is the deference afforded to an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations. This has, of course, been of
some interest now, since the Decker case. I happened to be a part
of one of the briefs that was cited by Scalia and by Chief Justice
Roberts, talking about the concerns with respect to Auer
deference. We will provide this deference to an agency's
interpretation. It will be given controlling weight, unless it is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.
Okay. At this point, when I go through all three of these, and
I try to do a dance, all my administrative law students just sort of
zone out, and I can imagine that might be the sense that you're
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having, like, really? Do we have to go through all those details
again? In fact, what this has prompted lots of professors to talk
about is whether this should be simpler, and the two that come to
mind here, Professor David Ziring and Richard Pierce, for
example, have looked at the rates of deference under each of these
doctrines, and, with one notable exception, have found that courts
defer in about seventy percent of the cases, no matter what the
doctrine is that is to be applied. And, of course, the exception here
is my Auer deference in Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
seems to really like Auer deference. It's had about a ninety percent
rate.
But this then prompts the question, why we would spend
time on a panel like this, thinking about and digging deeply into
Chevron deference. The idea is that the courts should just accept
the reality of these figures, and adopt a single rule of
reasonableness, or at least we should understand it as that. Now,
that would certainly make life a lot easier. It would be easier to
teach. I could take a couple of classes off. My students would
really like that. But I don't think that's as easy to swallow as it
first appears.
For me, the real turning point has been this project that I've
spent about a year now working on, looking at all the lower court
cases from the time Seminole Rock was decided, and then it was
transformed into Auer, and trying to trace that history. And I
think, when you spend that time looking through all of those
cases, you discover some interesting things, and, in particular, you
discover an interesting thing about the evolution of some of these
doctrines.
Each of the three doctrines, I'll just remind everybody, has
sort of really early roots. In particular, Skidmore, and then the
case that I, as a former Justice Stevens clerk, often associate with
Chevron as the ancestor to that, the case of NLRB v. Hearst, were
both decided in 1944. Seminole Rock was decided in 1945, and, of
course, this was a really formative period in the time of
administrative law. We have the APA being passed in 1946, and,
importantly, agencies looked very, very different, as Justice
Willett started us off. They looked very different than they look
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today. So the context and what was going on at that time turns
out to be very important.
We look at these three doctrines, and you find an interesting
historical story to be told for all three of them. For the purposes of
this panel, and for time, I'm going to focus on Chevron and Auer,
and the sort of history that I think they share.
As Professor Merrill and my good friend, Kathryn Watts,
have explained in their terrific article that came out in the
HarvardLaw Review more than ten years ago now-which, by the
way, Justice Stevens was very proud of; even though it told him he
got Chevron wrong, he was still equally proud of Kathryn-they've
explained that there was a very specific understanding, a
convention, regarding when Congress intended to give an agency
the power to act with a force of law when issuing regulations. It
turns out that in our work on Seminole Rock, we also have some
similarities.
We have Seminole Rock emerging from a time where agencies
were more limited. We have, in particular in Seminole Rock, the
Office of Price Administration (OPA), which was one of the few
agencies that was given rule-making power. It was in a time of
war, and it was doing price controls, which we do a lot of now-no.
So it has a very unique sort of history, and, in addition, if you take
a close reading-I would encourage all of you to go back and read
Seminole Rock-it makes clear that the deference was only
arrived at after the Court had done an independent judicial check
on the language of the regulation and was satisfied that the
interpretation was appropriate.
Part of this is, because there was so little rule-making at that
time, in the '40s and into the early '50s, there were relatively few
cases that raised Seminole Rock or even the question of the
convention with respect to Chevron. But then, very interestingly,
in the late '50s and '60s, there was great enthusiasm, a big push
for rule-making, and, again, as Professor Merrill and Watts
explored in their piece, we know that there was a collective
memory loss regarding the original convention, with respect to
laws that were giving agencies the power to act with a force of
law.
Well, it turns out we have the same thing happen with
Seminole Rock. Seminole Rock had very modest origins, and then,
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around this same time when we have a push for rule-making. It is
not surprising that once you start making more regulations, you
have more agencies going in and asking for deference to their
interpretation of regulations, and all of a sudden you lose the roots
of Seminole Rock. So this is a really important, critical time in
these deference doctrines, and for me, it makes a difference as to
how I think about the issues today.
This matters because that sense that there might be
something wrong or something amiss in applying these doctrines
is confirmed when you think about their development, that is,
questions that might be raised about the doctrines, the questions
that the panelists today are going to raise, questions about
separation of powers, delegations of Congress, the fundamental
due process considerations. I think those all start to make more
sense when you think about the gaping holes-and I think they're
gaping. I think there are very big holes in how these doctrines
developed over time.
So if you can't get from Point A in the mid 1940s, to Point B
in 2014, I think it should not surprise us that there could be
significant issues and questions that just were left unresolved or
unaddressed, and, in fact, that's what we see right now, and
especially in my work, with respect to Seminole Rock, you have all
kinds of cases, and it's remarkable the difference between the
language used in the late '40s and early '50s, and then you get to
the late '60s, and you think, is this the same court? And in some
instances, it's the same judge. No explanation.
For me, it seems only fair to suggest that the courts-I'm
going to use this and I hope people get this reference; I now have
figured out that I've aged out of cool in my classes, but that's okay.
That's okay. I'm handling it. But, anyway, in the words of Ricky
Ricardo, I think the Court has some explaining to do.
So, with that, I will turn it over to my fellow panelists. Thank
you.
[Applause.]

CHARLES

COOPER:

Good

afternoon,

ladies

and

gentlemen. It's a real honor for me to be on this panel with three
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very renowned administrative law professors, one of whom, at
least, is a pretty stylish dancer, I see. I don't know about you guys.
Probably not.
[Laughter.]
CHARLES COOPER: But, I have to confess I'm a little bit
intimidated. I don't study administrative agencies day in and day
out like my colleagues here. I sue them.
[Laughter and applause.]

CHARLES COOPER: And I like doing it. So it won't
surprise you, probably, to hear that I think it is high time that
Chevron was reconsidered, and that is exactly what is happening
broadly now in forums like this one, and also in the United States
Supreme Court, it appears. Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissent in
the City of Arlington v. FCC case, recently lamented "the danger
posed by the growing power of the administrative state." 2 The
Chief Justice was referring to the danger to liberty that the
separation of powers was designed to protect against. And he
emphasized that, "The Framers could hardly have envisioned
today's 'vast and varied federal bureaucracy' and the authority
administrative agencies now hold over our economic, social, and
political activities."3
Nor could the Framers have envisioned, surely, the wholesale
divestiture of constitutional powers, both legislative and judicial,
that has created the modern administrative state. I'd like to focus
my comments on the Arlington v. FCC case. The Court in
Arlington held that when a statute is ambiguous on whether a
certain substantive issue has been committed to agency discretion,
that is, whether the agency has authority from Congress to resolve
the issue with the force of law, the courts must give Chevron
deference to the agency's resolution of that ambiguity concerning
the scope of the agency's own authority.
The Court divided on unusual lines, with Justice Scalia
writing the majority opinion and Chief Justice Roberts writing a
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1878 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561
U.S. 477, 499 (2010)).
2
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dissent, in which Justices Alito and Kennedy joined. I think that
Justice Scalia got it wrong, and that Chief Justice Roberts got it
right.
My view on this follows from three premises, which I think
follow from the constitutional separation of powers. First, the
question whether Congress has committed-that is, has
delegated-a particular substantive issue to agency discretion is a
pure question of statutory interpretation. Second, construing a
federal statute in a final, binding way is an exercise of exclusively
judicial power. As Chief Justice Marshall famously put it, "it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is." 4

Third, an administrative agency has no power, no judicial
power, to construe a federal statute with a force that is binding on
an Article III court. The Constitution does not grant such judicial
power to administrative agencies, and such a judicial power
cannot be delegated to an administrative agency by Congress or by
the courts. Accordingly, a court is not required-indeed, it is not
permitted-to defer to an agency's decision on whether the agency
has statutory authority to decide a particular substantive issue
under the statute it administers.
In reconsidering Chevron, it is first critical to understand
precisely what kind of power, legislative or judicial, an
administrative agency exercises when it decides particular
substantive issues. The Supreme Court's Chevron decisions,
including Chevron itself, are deeply muddled on that question, and
the opinions in the Arlington case, both the majority and the
dissent, are the latest examples of that confusing muddle.
Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion in Arlington, describes
the Chevron rule as follows: "Statutory ambiguities will be
resolved, within the bounds of reasonable interpretation, not by
the courts but by the administering agency."5 Well, that certainly
sounds like the agency is exercising judicial interpretive power.
But elsewhere, Justice Scalia says that Chevron prevents judges
from "'substituting their own interstitial lawmaking' for that of
4 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803).
5 Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868 (majority opinion).
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the agency." 6 That, however, certainly sounds like the agency is
exercising legislative power. Finally, Justice Scalia says that "the
archetypal Chevron question" that agencies must routinely resolve
is "how best to construe an ambiguous statutory term, in light of
competing policy interests."7 Well, construing ambiguous
statutory terms sounds like a judicial function, but deciding
between competing policy interests is certainly a legislative power.
So, from this passage, it would appear that the agency is
exercising a strange mix of both powers simultaneously.
The Chief Justice's dissenting opinion is similarly muddled in
describing what kind of powers administrative agencies exercise.
Chief Justice Roberts explains, for example, that under Chevron,
"courts defer to an agency's interpretation of law when and
because Congress has conferred on the agency interpretive
authority over the question at issue."8 Well, that certainly sounds
like the agency is exercising a strictly judicial power conferred on
it by Congress. Now, contrast that statement with the following:
"[B]efore a court may grant [Chevron] deference, it must on its
own decide whether Congress-the branch vested with lawmaking
authority under the Constitution-has in fact delegated to the
agency lawmaking power over the ambiguity in question."9 This
statement makes it very clear that the agency is exercising
legislative power, delegated to it by Congress. Finally, Chief
Justice Roberts, very much like Justice Scalia, also suggests an
agency is simultaneously exercising both legislative and judicial
power. Here's one such statement, among many: "An agency's
interpretive authority, entitling the agency to judicial deference,
acquires its legitimacy from a delegation of lawmaking power,
from Congress to the Executive."' 0
I think it is constitutionally important to try to clear up this
confusion. I believe that Chevron's rule of judicial deference to
agency decisions can be sustained, if at all, only if the decision-

6 Id.
(1980)).
7 Id.
Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.

at 1873 (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568

at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
at 1880.
at 1886.
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making power exercised by the agencies is legislative in nature,
rather than judicial, and I think this is so for a number of reasons.
First, the essential rationale under Chevron for the rule of
deference to agency decisions is intelligible only if the agency is
exercising legislative power delegated by Congress. Indeed, the
Chevron Court itself explained agency power to decide particular
substantive issues as necessitated by Congress' decision not to
decide them itself-that is, Congress' decision not to make law.
This is what Chevron said: "The power of an administrative
agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of
rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.""
And the Chevron Court described the role of agencies as
''reconciling conflicting policies" and "resolving the competing
interests which Congress itself . . did not resolve."1 2 Finally, the
Chevron court noted the necessity for agencies to be able to change
their statutory interpretations. As the Court put it, "[T]he agency,
to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing
basis."' 3 These passages from Chevron describe how legislators

make law. It is the antithesis of how judges interpret law, at least
genuine judges.
There is an even more fundamental reason why an
administrative agency can constitutionally
exercise
only
legislative power, and not judicial power. It is a very hard
question, I think, from an original meaning standpoint, whether
Congress has authority under the Constitution to delegate its
legislative power to an executive branch agency. On that subject, I
refer you to a recent and provocative book by Professor Philip
Hamburger, entitled Is Administrative Law Unlawful?.
But even if one assumes that Congress has constitutional
authority to delegate a portion of its legislative power, at least
that is a power that it has. Congress surely cannot delegate a

11 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
12

Id. at 865.

13 Id. at 863.
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power that it does not have, and it has no judicial power at all to
delegate to the administrative agencies. It cannot exercise judicial
power, nor can it delegate such power. Thus, notwithstanding the
Court's frequent references, in Chevron and since, to congressional
delegations of binding interpretive authority to agencies, there can
be no such delegation because authority to make final, binding,
statutory interpretations-that is, authority to say what the law
is-is an exclusively judicial power.
And Congress surely cannot make the Supreme Court
subordinate to administrative agencies in the judicial function of
saying what the law is. Congress has express authority to create
such inferior courts, as it may from time to time, ordain and
establish, but even as to such inferior courts, Congress cannot
imbue their statutory interpretations with an authoritative
quality that is binding on the Supreme Court-that is, a quality
that requires the Supreme Court to accord deference to any
reasonable interpretation, even if it is not, in the words of
Chevron, "the reading the [Supreme Court] would have reached." 14
If that is true, then it would seem to follow that Congress
cannot delegate to unelected bureaucrats, or even to the
President, the judicial power to say what the law is. The agencies
are truly supreme over the Supreme Court if, in fact, that judicial
power can be delegated by Congress.
So what does all this mean, in the context of the Arlington
case? Well, I think it means at least this. When it comes to
resolving the purely legal question of whether Congress has
delegated to the agency law-making power over a particular
question, the agency's view on "what the law is" on that issue of
statutory interpretation is not entitled to judicial deference, and,
in fact, cannot constitutionally be accorded judicial deference by
the Court.
I want to make one final point. I think that the Arlington
decision has planted the seed of a revolutionary change in
Chevron's canonical, as Justice Scalia put it, two-step formulation,
because I just don't see how step one can survive, in its current
form anyway, the Arlington Court's holding that a court must
defer under Chevron to an agency's interpretation of a statutory

14

Id. at 843 n.11.
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ambiguity that concerns the scope of the agency's statutory
authority. Remember that the question at step one is whether
Congress' intent on the specific question at issue is clear and
unambiguously expressed, and if the answer to that is no-that is,
if the statute is ambiguous-then the agency, rather than the
Court, is entitled to resolve the ambiguity. In other words, the
existence of ambiguity in the statute is the source of the agency's
authority to resolve the ambiguity. But the question whether the
meaning of a statute is ambiguous is itself often ambiguous.
Judges often disagree on this question, as the recent Obamacare
cases dramatically illustrate. Federal reporters are filled with
divided courts on Chevron step one. So it follows, it seems to me,
from Arlington that an agency's determination that the statute's
meaning is ambiguous is one to which courts must defer, even if
they disagree, unless the agency's determination is unreasonable.
In other words, it appears that Arlington has merged Chevron's
steps one and two.
So, with that, I'll turn it over to my other panel members.
Thank you.
[Applause.]
JACK BEERMANNN: Great. Thank you. Thanks very
much. It's really a pleasure to be here. I haven't been at a
Federalist Society meeting in a long time. I think it was the early
1980s, when I was a student at University of Chicago Law School,
and I remember Robert Bork was on one of the panels. It was the
only time I had the privilege of meeting him, and he was amused
at my nametag, on which I had written "Earl Warren."
[Laughter.]
JACK BEERMANN: So that's where I was. Now, listening
to Chuck's presentation, I was wondering if maybe I was in the
panel that I really wanted to go to at this time on separation of
powers, but I guess it turns out that everything revolves around
separation of powers.
I have written a little bit on what's wrong with Chevron.
What's wrong with Chevron has always been pretty much wrong
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with Chevron, although it's gotten worse as time has gone by.
Attacking Chevron as a matter of legal craft is like shooting fish in
a barrel. It's one of the easiest targets in the history of the world,
because it's really very difficult to figure out what Chevron really
is about. Is it about interpretation of statutes? Is it about policy
decisions? Just what is it about? To think that we've had the case
around for thirty years and we still can't figure it out, I think says
a lot about what's wrong with Chevron.
I don't think what's wrong with Chevron is a separation of
powers matter, and I'm going to get to that later, although I
respect Chuck's views, and he's really expressed them very
eloquently. I really don't think that there's a separation of powers
issue going on here at all, but I'll explain that a little bit later.
Now, just to illustrate a little bit about how Chevron works,
Gary Lawson and I are sharing an office this year, because we're
in temporary offices because of a construction project. Some of you
may know Gary. He was one of the founders of The Federalist
Society, and Gary is one of the funniest people you'll ever hear
speak. Any time you get a chance to hear Gary speak-and it's not
too often because he doesn't like to travel-he always has a great
way of approaching something. So I'm trying to channel him a
little bit, and I'm thinking about what Chevron is like.
Think about it this way: it's Christmas morning, and you've
given this great big toy, in a box, with 1,000 parts, to one of your
children. And, of course, you've got to put it together. So you open
it up and there's this book of instructions that was translated by
someone who really wasn't a native English speaker, and the
pictures are pretty much indecipherable, and there are 1,000
parts, and you're working on it, and you're grunting and groaning,
and huffing and puffing, and sweating. And it's three hours later
and it looks like maybe the thing is put together right, except that
you have a whole handful of parts still in your hand. Chevron is
like those instructions.
[Laughter.]
JACK BEERMANN: As a lawyer, you have to know the
rudimentary thing about how to do this or you'll never get it even
close to right. But you can't actually solve the problem of any case
using Chevron, because Chevron basically means whatever the
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particular court, or the particular judge, at the particular time,
wants it to mean, and the great divide that occurred with Chevron
happened between the first Chevron case and a very closely
following case, and it had to do with a footnote that Justice
Stevens put in the original Chevron case. I'll just try to explain
that briefly.
The original Chevron said, basically, that if Congress had
directly spoken to the precise issue in question, that was the end
of the matter and everyone was bound by that. But, if Congress
had not directly spoken, then it was ambiguous. We presumed
there was a delegation. I don't need to tell you all this. And then
you go on to step two, which is, is there a permissible
construction? Justice Stevens wrote a footnote, I believe it's
footnote number 9, which said that issues of statutory
interpretation are for the courts to decide. Okay. So what was that
whole step one about?
[Laughter.]
JACK BEERMANN: In a later case, the Cardoza-Fonseca
case,
the Court elaborated that in deciding what a statute
means, you use the traditional tools of statutory construction, and
that means tools like canons of construction. My favorite is
noscitur a sociis. And whatever you look at to determine statutory
meaning, except that Justice Scalia would never look at legislative
history, but every other tool of statutory interpretation is open.
Now, the Court didn't make it clear it if the traditional tools
language in Cardoza-Fonsecawas about Chevron's step one or if it
was about some pre-Chevron notion, as Chuck was talking about,
where we have to figure out if the agency has been delegated
authority, but it seems that, in later cases, the Court has saidand the lower courts have picked up on this-that in step one, in
trying to figure out what the statute means, you can use all the
traditional tools of statutory interpretation, and only when you
can't answer the statutory question do you then get to step two.
15

15

I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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The question then becomes what did we gain by having
Chevron, then? I think maybe billable hours for attorneys, arguing
about Chevron, is about the only thing that we gain.
[Laughter and applause.]

JACK BEERMANN: I wrote an article which was much too
long, and it could have been even longer except that they now
have word limits on law review articles in a lot of journals. I said
that, basically, every moment that's spent arguing about whether
Chevron applies, and, if so, how it applies, is wasted effort for the
lawyers, and wasted effort for the judges. They should just talk
about the case. What does the statute mean? What is our best
sense of what Congress meant? And if Congress meant to delegate
the decision-making authority to the agency, then is what the
agency did within the scope of review that applies to that
particular case? Is it arbitrary or capricious, or supported by
substantial evidence, or correct if it's subject to de novo review, or
whatever.
If you look at how Chevron has been handled by the courts,
you get a pretty good idea that Chevron isn't really what decides
any cases. There are two things I want to talk about here. In one
of my two articles about Chevron, I counted up decisions. Who do
you think on the Supreme Court defers to agencies the most? The
most is Chief Justice Roberts. It used to be that Roberts and Alito
were tied. Now, I'm not counting Justices Kagan and Sotomayor
because they're too new. They're off the charts in terms of how
much they defer, but it's not surprising because they're still
deciding cases by the agencies controlled by the President that
appointed them. And the sample is too small to draw any
conclusions.
Who do you think defers the least? You can give the same
answer that you just gave about who you thought defers the most.
Justice Scalia defers the least. That's because Justice Scalia,
applying the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, mainly
the plain meaning rule, is more confident in his ability to read
statutes than the other members of the Supreme Court are-and
he said this. He has stated in print that under his approach to
statutory interpretation he is more likely to find clear meaning
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and thus more likely to decide cases in Chevron step one, which
means he won't defer to agencies as frequently as other judges.1 6
In most of the cases the votes line up how you would expect
them to line up, whether Chevron existed or not. That is, in the 54 cases where Chevron is applied, Justice Kennedy decides which
side wins. Whichever side he's on, it's those four plus him, or the
other four plus him. It's pretty rare that the lineup gets mixed
around the way it got mixed around in the City of Arlington case.
Usually, if it's a 7-2 decision, it's always two on the extreme, on
one end or the other. The lineup of votes has nothing to do with
how they think Chevron applies. It has to do with what they think
of the merits of the case, usually along the liberal-conservative
spectrum. That's how our judges decide cases when Chevron
applies. So I think that's a good illustration, if you look at the
actual cases, to say how content-less Chevron is.
Now, to another point. There's a little-known case that's come
up to the Supreme Court you might have heard about, about
whether people who purchase health insurance on federally run
exchanges are eligible for subsidies.' 7 It is before both the D.C.
Circuit' 8 and the Fourth Circuit.1 9 In both of those cases, both

sides, the challengers and the government, argued that the case
should be decided under step one, based on clear statutory
meaning. Of course, diametrically opposed clear statutory
meaning. The D.C. Circuit decided that it was clear statutory
meaning against the government's position in its panel decision.
The Fourth Circuit decided that, based on the entire
structure of the statute, and the history and the purposes, all
those traditional tools of statutory construction, that the statute
was ambiguous. And then the Court decided that, in light of the

16 The
Honorable Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521.
17 This is a reference to the issue that was ultimately decided in King v. Burwell,
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). Subsequent to the date of this panel, the Supreme Court
decided that Chevron did not apply at all to this issue because Congress could not have
intended to delegate to an agency the important question whether subsidies were
available to those purchasing health insurance on federally run exchanges.
18 Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
19 King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014).
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purposes of the statute, the government's interpretation was-and
now I'm going to quote the two words-"entirely sensible." 20 Not
the "permissible construction" but "entirely sensible." And that
says another thing about the way that our courts function, which
is that they set up rules of decision and then they don't follow
them. They say whatever they want, in any particular case, if it
sounds good in the opinion.
So instead of applying the directly spoken to the precise
question at issue version of step one, when it became better to say
traditional tools of statutory construction, they said that. First
they had permissible construction as the requirement of step two,
now it's entirely sensible. It's whatever courts think is the
reasonable way to do it in the particular case. In other words, you
could take Chevron totally out of the mix, and it's just their
traditional judicial opinion.
In thinking about the failure of Chevron over the thirty years,
think about other legal standards that are designed as decisionmaking processes, rather than substantive rules. Think about, for
example, how you decide whether there's an entitlement in a case
involving a government benefit or government employment. You
use the entitlement theory from the Roth2l case, about whether
there is a legitimate claim of entitlement. And consider equal
protection doctrine, with the three tiers of scrutiny. Imagine if
today, after all these years, we didn't know how to figure out if
somebody had a property interest, or we couldn't even figure out
what tier of scrutiny do we apply to what kind of case. Those rules
work pretty well in that they frame the decision making process in
a fairly predictable way.
Chevron doesn't frame anything. You even have one Justice
on the Court that says there's only one step in Chevron, and that's
Justice Scalia, and some scholars have said that's true, there's
only one step in Chevron. So we don't even know how many steps
there are. Some people say one. Some people say two. Some people
say three. Some people say four. And if you don't know about four,
I have an article where I explain what the fourth step is.
[Laughter.]
20
21

Id. at 375.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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JACK BEERMANN: The last thing I'll say about this, before
I go on to the Arlington case and the separation of powers is that,
to me, the best illustration of the failure of Chevron is Justice
Stevens' last Chevron opinion. I believe it was his last opinion. It
was in Negusie v. Holder,22 where the Supreme Court decided the
case based on Chevron, and deferred, and Justice Stevens
dissented, and he said, in effect, "This is an issue of statutory
interpretation, for the courts to decide. It shouldn't be decided
under Chevron." Okay. There we go again. What is it about? Is it
about deference to policy? If it were about deference to policy,
you'd think we'd be using the arbitrary, capricious standard. In
fact, the Court has said more than once that step two of Chevron
is the same thing as the arbitrary, capricious standard, but they're
totally different, so what do they mean by that?
Okay. That's enough beating up on Chevron. Poor Chevron.
Now I want to talk about why I don't think that the City of
Arlington2 3 is really a chink in the armor of Chevron, or that it
violates separation of powers. I just want to start with one
question-Is there a right to judicial review of rules? Is there a
constitutional right to judicial review of rules? Does it violate
separation of powers when Congress makes an exemption from
judicial review? Justice Scalia would actually lean the other way.
He'd say, "Judicial review may violate separation of powers,
because it takes away from the President's ability to faithfully
execute the laws." And I think Gary Lawson also agrees with that.
There is no constitutional right to judicial review of agency
action except when agency action is an adjudication of private
rights, where there might be a problem with Article III. Let me
repeat that. There is no constitutional right to judicial review of
agency action, period. So, what that means is, if Congress said no
judicial review at all of any of these rules, we wouldn't have to ask
whether Chevron applies to jurisdictional rules or not. There just
wouldn't be judicial review.
Now, when Congress passes a statute, delegating authority to
an agency, I agree with Chuck. It cannot delegate judicial power,
22
23

555 U.S. 511 (2009).
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
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and it also cannot delegate legislative power. What it does is, it
delegates power for the Executive Branch to execute the law. And
this is what Justice Scalia said in the Whitman v. American
Trucking24 opinion. The Executive Branch can only execute the
law. They can't legislate. Only Congress can legislate. They can't
adjudicate. They can't use the judicial power of the United States.
Only federal judges can do that.
But what they can do is they can execute the law, and they
can use different kinds of procedures. Let me just give a simple
example. Suppose you have to apply for a permit for grazing in
some federal land, and there's a certain factual standard. You
have to meet certain requirements and the land can't already be
overgrazed. So now, you file your application and the agency isn't
sure whether it should grant it or not, so they ask you in for a
meeting, and they say, "Let's talk about this," because it would be
the quintessential execution of the law to grant you or deny you
your permit. So now they call you in for a meeting, and they invite
someone from the enforcement office of the agency to sit on the
other side of the room. You give your presentation about why you
should get it, and they give their presentation about why you
shouldn't get it. That's not adjudication. That's execution of the
law. They happen to be using an adjudicatory form to do it.
Now, suppose the agency wants to let people know in
advance, what does it mean to have the land overgrazed, because
Congress said overgrazed? So now they put out a little statement
that says, "Overgrazed means less than X, Y, Z density of growth."
I don't know anything about grazing[Laughter.]

JACK BEERMANN: -but

less than a certain density of

plant life in the field. That is not legislation. That is that agency
executing that law that Congress gave it the power to execute. I
think that's what Justice Scalia meant when he said that there's
no delegation of legislative power, at all, and Justice Stevens

disagreed and said there is a delegation of legislative power. I
happen to be with Justice Scalia on this one.

24

Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
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So, let me just finish up by saying, what does that mean
about Chevron? Okay. So now, the question in Chevron, and about
the jurisdiction of an agency, in my view, every single question is
jurisdictional, and that's why the Chief Justice was wrong and
Justice Scalia was right in City of Arlington, because if an agency
tries to enforce something against you, in order for them to do
something to you, even if you can't get judicial review of the rule
because Congress has said no judicial review of these rules, if the
agency tries to issue an order against you, and do something to
you, you can go to court and try to stop the agency from doing that
to you. And in the course of that proceeding, your defense is that
the agency didn't have authority to do this to you, because they
haven't been delegated this power from Congress, either because
Congress told them, statutorily, to do something different, or
because Congress said, "You have to do it reasonably." In this
case, they didn't do it reasonably.
So the question in all cases is ultra vires, that is, has
Congress delegated the authority to the Executive Branch to do
this to you? That's a jurisdictional question in every single case of
administrative law, and that's why City of Arlington is correct.
[Applause.]
THOMAS W. MERRILL: Thanks very much. It's great to be
back here again. I have been here since 1981, I think.
[Laughter.]
THOMAS MERRILL: Let me start with a brief biographical
note. My first serious involvement with Chevron was when I was
working in the government as Deputy Solicitor General. I was in
charge of cases coming out of the Civil Division of the Justice
Department, which represents the various federal agencies, and
after about a year on the job, I told my friends that I was actually
the Deputy Solicitor General for Chevron, because every single
case that came up from the Civil Division involved some Chevron
issue. The government was obviously thrilled with Chevron and
was trying very much to make it as secure as possible, avoid any
type of trimming back, so they were kind of worried about the
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Supreme Court. We tried to keep these cases out of the Supreme
Court because we were apprehensive, at that time, that maybe the
Court would trim back on Chevron.
After I left the government, I started reflecting on my
experience, and I quickly came to the conclusion-I was an
academic again, so I was liberated from my client obligations-I
concluded that Chevron was a bad idea. I actually wrote a little
essay, that's buried in some magazine somewhere, called
"Confessions of a Chevron Apostate," in which I said that although
I'd been Deputy Solicitor General for Chevron, I no longer thought
that Chevron should be good law.
I've written about eight articles on Chevron. It's kind of an
embarrassing thing to disclose.
[Laughter.]
THOMAS MERRILL: We all have to do something for a
living. I think the first two articles I wrote, in the early '90s,
shortly after I finished being Deputy Solicitor General, essentially
argued for the overruling of Chevron. I thought it was basically a
very flawed doctrine, a bad idea. I guess if I had to summarize it, I
would say that it's faux formalism. It sort of looks, on its face, like
a formalistic doctrine-step one, step two, and so forth. You can
organize opinions and briefs very nicely around Chevron. I think
that's one of the secrets of its success.
But what are the steps? The first step is clear or not clear,
and the second step is reasonable or not reasonable, and those are
not rules. Those are the biggest, squishiest, fattest standards you
can imagine. And by suggesting that the entire realm of judicial
review of agency interpretation can be funneled into those two
concepts, it produces enormous confusion and enormous disutility.
Now, I want to say something nice about Chevron, because no
one else has said anything nice about Chevron. I do think that
Chevron deserves credit for, I think, planting the idea in our
jurisprudence that, in some situations, cases of statutory
interpretation are actually cases about policy-they're not just
cases about meaning or how to construe statutory enactmentand for suggesting that when, in fact, the case of interpretation
becomes a case of policy, there are some strong reasons for
preferring administrative or executive interpretation rather than
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judicial interpretation, namely the greater accountability that
agencies have through their responsiveness to both the Congress
and the President, elected officials, and also their greater
experience and expertise.
Now, that's not to say that Chevron does a very good job of
telling us where the line is between interpretation and policy. It
doesn't do a very good job of that at all, and that's generated
enormous disputes, and so forth. But I did want to say one nice
thing about Chevron.
Why do we have judicial review of agency action? We have a
number of reasons for that. Maybe it's not required
constitutionally, except in cases of private rights, but it serves a
number of useful functions. One of them is to protect individuals
against bureaucratic arbitrariness. That's pretty important.
Another is to try to encourage agencies to be more accountable by
explaining the reasons for their decisions. That's pretty important.
Third, one of the most important functions of judicial review is to
maintain and police the boundaries between the different
governmental actors in our system.
Now, Jack is right that Congress doesn't have to create
judicial review in order to help maintain and police boundaries,
the outer limits of agency authority, and so forth. But the reality
is that Congress has consistently done that, and I think they've
done it precisely because they perceive that judicial review is
helpful in making sure that agencies don't start running amok
and engaging in regulation where Congress never contemplated
that they actually have authority to regulate.
But it's not just a matter of delegation. It's not just a matter
of the delegated authority of the agency. There's a bunch of other
important boundaries. There's the Constitution, for example. We
don't want agencies violating people's constitutional rights.
There's the question of one agency usurping the authority of
another agency or another entity of government. There's a very
important question of federalism. We don't want federal agencies
running roughshod over the traditional prerogatives of the state
and local governments. All these boundaries are very important,
and I think the function of judicial review, in critical respects, is to
try to maintain stability in these boundaries.
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The Court, in Chevron, didn't say anything about boundary
maintenance, because I think they perceived the question in
Chevron, which was the meaning of a stationary source of air
pollution, was clearly within the ambit of the EPA's authority, so
there wasn't any boundary maintenance issue to be resolved.
Later decisions like Arlington have brought this question to the
fore.
There are three ways, in principal, that you could engage in
boundary maintenance through the lens of the Chevron doctrinestep one, step two, and what has come to be called step zero, or the
preliminary threshold inquiry into whether or not the agency has
been given sufficient authority to have its interpretations
reviewed under Chevron as opposed to Skidmore or something
else.
Now, the Court has sometimes used step one to engage in
boundary maintenance. I would remind you of the case of FDA v.
Brown and Williamson Tobacco,25 where the question was
whether or not the FDA had authority to regulate tobacco
products. The Court purported to apply step one in answering that
question. It wrote twenty-nine pages about all the testimony that
various FDA commissioners had made over the years, and how
Congress had responded by giving the Federal Trade Commission
certain authority, and so forth. And after twenty-nine pages of
this excruciating analysis, the Court said, "It's clear that Congress
never gave the FDA authority to regulate tobacco products." So
that has happened.
Another possibility is to regulate boundaries under step two,
where you ask whether or not the agency's interpretation is
reasonable. You could say that a boundary violating agency action
is unreasonable, and Justice Scalia did that, just last term in a
case involving the interpretation of the PSD provisions of the
Clean Air Act, which I'm going to come back to.
A third option, which is basically the one that was rejected in
City of Arlington is that courts could ask, before they get to
Chevron, as part of step zero, if you will, is the issue before us one
in which the agency has been given delegated authority to act
with the force of law? Courts could decide using independent

25 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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judgment whether or not the agency is exceeding its various
jurisdictional boundaries-legislative separation of powers,
constitutional and federalism boundaries, at step zero. A version
of this was enforced by Chief Justice Roberts in his dissent, but
Justice Scalia, speaking for Justice Thomas and the three most
liberal justices on the Court, disagreed and said, as some of the
other panelists have described, that agencies, in cases of
ambiguity, get to decide the scope of their own authority, a
proposition I find utterly astonishing.
None of these three options, I think, are very satisfactory. To
illustrate, let me talk briefly about an issue that I think that any
reasonable person, a fair-minded person would have to
acknowledge. It pertains to the questions of the legitimate
boundaries of agency action. This is the question of whether the
EPA has authority to adopt an aggressive and wide-ranging
program to regulate greenhouse gases in order to combat climate
change.
In fact, we do have some confrontations with this, under
Chevron. The first one occurred in 2007, in a case called
Massachusetts v. EPA,26 in which the Supreme Court essentially
addressed this issue under step one of Chevron. The question in
that case was whether or not EPA was required to institute a
rulemaking to decide whether or not to limit tailpipe emissions of
motor vehicles in order to reduce greenhouse gases. There was an
agonizing standing debate in the case, and so forth, but eventually
the Court decided that Massachusetts had standing because a
millimeter of land might have disappeared because of rising
oceans, and it went on to rule that, in fact, EPA does have
jurisdiction over global warming and greenhouse gases.
The reason it gave was, unfortunately, rather not untypical
for a step one decision. It focused on one little provision of the
Clean Air Act, which was a definition of the word "air pollutant,"
and it interpreted that one little provision under step one. The
language says that "an air pollutant includes any physical,
chemical, biological, radioactive substance or matter which is
emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air." The Court said,
26

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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"Well, you know, carbon dioxide and so forth enters the ambient
air. It's a chemical. Therefore, greenhouse gases are air pollutants.
Therefore, EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse gases.
Therefore, EPA has to consider this rule-making petition to
regulate tailpipe emissions, in order to limit climate change."
That was kind of ironic, in my view, because it was the kind
of wooden literalism that liberals are constantly accusing some
textualist conservative judges of engaging in-I think wrongly. I
think textualism is much more sophisticated than that. But, in
this case, a coalition of justices, led by Justice Stevens, and
including the liberals and Justice Kennedy, in a weak moment,
decided to engage in literalism in order to force the Bush
administration to get on with it and start regulating climate
change. That was the message being sent in that particular case.
So here we have step one being used by a court to resolve a
jurisdictional issue in favor of the agency. The Bush
administration was arguing that it didn't want to regulate. The
Supreme Court says, no, you have to regulate. So the
jurisdictional issue was resolved under step one, in a fashion that
I think was virtually mindless.
If anybody who knew the Clean Air Act would be consulted
about whether or not greenhouse gases can be regulated
meaningfully in the Clean Air Act, the answer would be this
makes no sense whatsoever. There are all sorts of provisions in
the Clean Air Act that would be nonsensical under that
understanding, the most central is that the Clean Air Act requires
the designation of certain critical pollutants that are regulated by
ambient air quality standards, and when a pollutant is designated
as such, it has to be reduced so that it has zero health and zero
welfare effects. It's literally impossible to regulate greenhouses
gases so it has zero health and welfare effects, because we have no
authority over what most of the world does in the way of emitting
greenhouse gases.
Okay. So that was step one. What about step two? The next
confrontation with greenhouse gases occurred last year, in a case
called Utility Air Group,2 7 in which the Court considered
regulations that EPA had promulgated under what are called the

27

Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
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Prevention of Significant Deterioration Provisions of the Clean Air
Act, which is designed to prevent states from allowing their air
quality to deteriorate down to the level of these national ambient
air quality standards. EPA, in an exercise of extraordinary
contortion, had interpreted the PSD provision to say that, well,
greenhouse gases are pollutants, and the PSD regulations are
triggered when any pollutant above a certain threshold is emitted,
and, therefore, if somebody is emitting enough greenhouse gases,
they have to comply with these new regulations under the PSD
program, with respect to new sources.
The little problem that this presented was that the PSD
provisions have numeric thresholds for how much pollution you
have to emit in order to be subject to these regulations, and it's a
little bit complicated, but it's basically 100 tons of pollutant a
year. If you made every source that emitted 100 tons of pollution a
year file a PSD permit and comply with regulations, every
apartment house, every school, every restaurant, every dry
cleaning shop in the United States would be subject to the PSD
program. So recognizing this, EPA decided that it would change
the 100-ton-per-year threshold, in the case of greenhouse gases, to
100,000 tons per year. So, with that little trick, EPA then
promulgated these regulations.
Justice Scalia, writing for fives Justices, held that this was
invalid. He said that, in fact, the definition of pollutant, for PSD
purposes, has to mean everything but greenhouse gases. How he
got around Massachusetts v. EPA is a little unclear, because
Massachusetts had said that pollutant requires that you include
greenhouse gases. But Justice Scalia said that a pollutant is
ambiguous, EPA has interpreted it differently under different
sections, so it must be ambiguous. He didn't say that step one was
violated, obviously, because he said it was ambiguous, but he said
it was unreasonable, and it was unreasonable primarily because
you can't rewrite the statute. If you interpret the statute in such a
way that you have to rewrite part of the statute to change 100 to
mean 100,000, that's unreasonable. He got five votes for that.
Actually, Alito and Thomas also concurred in that.
So you might think, this is a victory, right? Let's use step two
to police the boundaries of agency action. Not quite so fast. The
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opinion then goes on to discuss another aspect of the EPA
regulation, which was that if the source emits over 100 tons of
some other pollutant which is regulated, then it has to comply
with greenhouse gas emission controls, and Justice Scalia
apparently didn't have the votes or didn't want to invalidate that
regulation as unreasonable. And it turns out that that second
regulation covers ninety-seven percent of the relevant sources that
the EPA wanted to regulate under PSD. So the victory on the first
part of the case was symbolic, and the government regards this as
a major victory.
What about using Chief Justice Roberts' proposal in
Arlington to police the boundaries of agency action under step
zero? Actually, I think this is the best of the three possibilities, but
I'm not very optimistic either, here, if you think about, again, EPA
and the Clean Air Act, and climate change. Chief Justice Roberts
basically said that the way to try to do this under step zero is to
require that you show that the particular issue in question is one
as to which the agency has been given authority to act with the
force of law. So you would not just look at a generic rule-making
grant. You'd look at the specific section of the statute or the
clause, and see whether or not there's a rule-making grant there,
or an exception to rule-making power in that particular section.
The problem with this, in terms of the EPA and the Clean Air
Act is that virtually every section of the Clean Air Act includes a
rule-making grant to the EPA, so it doesn't really matter whether
the EPA is trying to rewrite regulations under the stationary
source provision, Section 111(d), or PSD or the non-attainment
sections, or the mobile source provisions. They all have rulemaking grants. They all authorize EPA to regulate with the force
of law, as those grants are currently understood. So it may be that
even if Chief Justice Roberts' approach is ultimately accepted, it
wouldn't do much in the way of giving courts authority to police
the boundaries of agency authority.
What's really needed is not Chevron, step one, two, or zero.
What is needed is an inquiry, at the outside of the case, that asks,
honestly, whether the entire statute, in the context of its historical
enactment and development, is one in which Congress gave the
agency authority to regulate the phenomenon in question. Courts
should be engaging in independent judgment about this issue,
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without trying to sandwich their inquiry into the shackles of
Chevron.
Filtering the inquiry through Chevron has made it
significantly more difficult to reach the honest answer about these
questions, and, in this respect, I think Chevron is contributing to a
distortion of the form of government given to us under the
Constitution, and threatens to undermine the boundaries that
have been so carefully nurtured for most of our history.
Thank you.
[Applause.]

JUSTICE DON WILLETT: Well, this has been a very
genteel and well-mannered panel. Does anybody want to cause a
ruckus or take any gloves off before we go to the audience for
Q&A? Chuck, you're always game for that, right? Nobody has any
kind of rebuttal or impertinent questions for your fellow panelists?
CHARLES COOPER: I'm not going to take the gloves off
here, but I am going to make an observation about Professor
Beermann's very forceful and elegant discussion explaining how
the executive agencies, the administrative agencies, exercise only
executive authority. No matter how much the function that they're
engaged in may quack like a legislative function, or may quack
like an adjudicative or judicial function, it's nonetheless an
executive function. It puts me in mind of Justice Scalia's
observation in footnote four in the Arlington case, where he
criticizes Chief Justice Roberts' observation, much like mine, that
the administrative agencies are exercising legislative and judicial
power. And he says-this is from footnote 4-"[T]he dissent
overstates when it claims that agencies exercise legislative power
and judicial power. . . . [Agency] activities take 'legislative' and
'judicial' forms, but they are exercises of-indeed under our
constitutional structure, they must be exercises of-the 'executive
Power."'

28

Well, that assertion is very unsatisfying to me. Yes, it is true,
I think, under our structure of government, that executive officers
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and the President can exercise only executive powers, but I don't
think that fact means that any power they exercise is, therefore,
an executive power, no matter what it really is when you analyze
it in terms of its actual function. Again, I think Chief Justice
Roberts was right that separation of powers restrictions do apply
here.
And I guess I want to conclude by asking a question, and that
is, what do my fellow panelists think about Chevron step one, in
light of the Arlington decision? How will Justice Scalia, in the
future, as he approaches step one, using the ordinary tools of
judicial construction, as he says, attempt to decide correctly,
whether or not the provision at issue is ambiguous, in light of
Arlington's decision that says the question of ambiguity, if it is
itself ambiguous, then we must defer to the agency itself. Isn't
step one, now, collapsed?
THOMAS MERRILL: I agree with that, basically. I would
put it in terms of the Administrative Procedure Act, actually. A lot
of people have pointed out that the Administrative Procedure Act
requires courts to decide all relevant questions of law, and then
they say, "Well, if that's the law of the land, where do we get
Chevron?" Now, there is an answer to that, which is that you can
reconcile Chevron with the APA by saying that Chevron rests on a
determination that Congress has implicitly, at least, delegated to
the agency the power to resolve ambiguities under this particular
statute, and so the Court, by deferring to the agency, is, in fact,
following the law. It's interpreting the law and following the law
that Congress has laid down.
The problem is you can't extend that argument to the
question of whether or not the agency's acting within the scope of
its jurisdiction, because the whole premise of reconciling Chevron
with the requirement that, of course, decide questions of law is
that the agency has been delegated authority to decide these
questions of law, but that question can't be answered by the
agency. It has to be decided by the Court, and the APA actually
explicitly says that questions of whether the agency is acting
within the scope of its jurisdiction are for the Court to decide. It
says that, in so many words, not quoted anywhere by Justice
Scalia in Arlington.
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JUSTICE DON WILLETT: Does anyone else want to chime
in? Okay. There's a staggeringly long line at the microphone.
There you go.
ATTENDEE: Can I ask the panel whether they think that
it's just a coincidence that Chevron is a Clean Air Act case? I'm
inferring from Professor Merrill's remarks that he does not think
that's a coincidence. And I want to frame it a little more and say
why I ask that. Two reasons. One, we had the two competing
justifications for deference, one of which is the implicit delegation
and the other agency expertise. It seems like the latter has gone
more and more by the wayside over the decades.
But if you go back and reread Chevron, it is impossible to
escape the impression that part of what the Court is doing there is
saying, "We're lawyers. We're not scientists." That seems now to
have fallen by the wayside, and, actually, in the EPA rules, which
Professor Merrill alluded to, that will be subject to a great, big,
nasty Chevron fight eventually to in the courts. The EPA is
demanding deference for legislative history, and things that look
nothing like its technical ambit, that it has zero specialty in.
And then the other question I want to ask is, very briefly, the
part of the formulation that always drops out is under-theorized,
as far as I've been able to tell has no definitive academic or court
statements on what it means is a statute that it has been
entrusted to administer, whether it's your statute to talk about in
the first place. Again, EPA is making certain claims that it now
has deference to interpret energy acts that have nothing to do
with EPA, and are not entrusted to it, at all.
So, does the panel see that there's any possibility in, thirty
years later, or thirty-three years later, however long it takes us to
actually get there in the courts, that these power plant rules may
lead to not just dinking around with the Clean Air Act, but
another whack at sort of the roots of Chevron?

JUSTICE DON WILLETT: Who wants to tackle that?
CHARLES COOPER: That sounds like a question for
Professor Merrill.
[Laughter.]
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THOMAS MERRILL: Okay. All right. No, I don't think it's a
coincidence that the environmental area was where this doctrine
emerged. Actually, one of these eight articles I wrote is a kind of a
history of how the Chevron doctrine came to be, and I went back
and read the notes from the Supreme Court's deliberations about
the Chevron doctrine, and Justice Blackmun kept rather
meticulous notes, and they're in the Library of Congress. Anybody
can go look at them.
It was quite interesting to read the notes about the
conference in the Chevron case. I don't think anybody understood
anything about what was going on in that case. They made all
sorts of nonsensical statements about what various lower court
decisions had decided about stationary source regulation under
non-attainment, and under PSD, and so on and so forth. Finally,
Justice Stevens, who was then, I think, second most junior justice,
spoke, and he gave a slightly more cogent explanation of the
issues, but then he said, "I'm just really confused."
[Laughter.]
THOMAS MERRILL: And he said, "When I'm confused, I go
with the agency." And then he got the assignment to write the
opinion from Justice White, and the rest is history. So I don't
think it's a coincidence. I think that there is something about
hyper-technical, you know, difficult to comprehend, statutory
interpretation questions that is likely to incline the courts to want
to turn this over to somebody that's a little bit more capable of
answering these questions in a coherent way. EPA is sort of
ground zero for that. There are a bunch of other agencies, like the
Federal Reserve Board, and so forth, that also decide things that
are highly technical and beyond the ken of most judges.
That's a very realist explanation for when judges defer and
when they don't, but I think there's a lot of merit to it.
JUSTICE DON WILLETT: Anyone else? Mr. Hayes, from
the Lone Star State.
ATTENDEE: Yes, sir. Thank you. This question comes, in
part, from many, many years spent in the trenches, dealing with
administrative agencies, day to day, practicing law, and it strikes
me that, to some extent, the elephant in the room may be-and I
would like to hear the comment as to whether you think it is or
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not-what might be called the myth of administrative expertise,
that has been alluded to here. Certainly, in my experience, I often
find that the agencies either don't have the expertise, either
technically or from a legal standpoint, or if it is buried someplace
in the large bureaucracy, it's not brought to bear on the particular
rule or question that's addressed, and that, indeed, we frequently
neglect the fact that there are many institutional factors driving
these very large and often sprawling bureaucracies, that denigrate
from any expertise that might be there. I find that aspect of these
discussions seems to be neglected in favor of, for instance, I think,
very good thoughts on the separation of powers issues and other
issues. Thank you.
JACK BEERMANN: I'll take a quick stab at that. There are
questions where the agencies seem to have a lot of expertise and
questions where they don't. For example, in this issue about the
subsidies under the Federal Health Care Exchanges, everyone
believes the agency when they say that the whole system is going
to fall apart if they don't have the subsidies for the federal plans.
So that's not much of an expertise issue, and it's one of those sort
of delicious, law-school-type statutory construction problems.
The question under the Clean Air Act that was at issue in
Chevron is clearly a matter for agency expertise, and the question
is comparative expertise, that is, that you get a question which is
right in the agency's wheelhouse and unless you think the agency
is always engaged in raw politics and you shouldn't defer to them
at all, if it's right in the agency's wheelhouse, then who's going to
know better, the Court or the agency? Chances are, in many
situations, not all but in many situations, the agency is going to
know better. And, on the top of it, it's not like the courts are
applying expertise and legal reasoning, or some sort of thing,
when they decide these cases. They're deciding it based on where,
on the political spectrum, the particular case falls. I mean, it's not
a surprise when the 5-4 cases occur.
Going back to my umpiring, I found it insulting to say that
the Supreme Court behaves like umpires, when Chief Justice
Roberts said that, because if we walked on the field and people
knew how we were going to decide in advance of the game, we
wouldn't be allowed to umpire.
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[Laughter.]
AMY WILDERMUTH: I'm going to add just a little bit to
that, and I know, drawing on Seminole Rock is a little different.
But it seems to me that you do see, in the context of deference
doctrines, if you look historically, again, looking at very modest
roots, and you think about expertise as driving some of those
decisions, which it seems very clear that they were limited in that
way. It is also clear that we have a very big expansion of those
deference doctrines, and part of what has changed is moving away
from thinking about when the agency is truly acting in an area
where it really does have special expertise, versus some other
justification for their actions.
JUSTICE DON WILLETT: This will be our final question.
Gala time is almost upon us, and some of us need more time than
others to get gussied up and prepare. I've got to tie that tie.
[Laughter.]
ATTENDEE: Do you have a bow tie? It takes a while to read
the directions.
I'm Mike Daugherty. Many of you might know that I'm
embroiled with the LabMD v. FTC case. I'm the CEO of LabMD.
My question is, really-and I'll backfill it a little bit after askingwhat's it going to take? What are the circumstances it's going to
take to get rid of Chevron? Because, I will tell you, in my
experience as a layperson as a CEO, and as an American, is I had
certain expectations of how this country was run, what my rights
were, and the power that the agencies have are dumbfounding to
every other business professional that I've talked to, that I've gone
through this meat grinder on.
It is a mountain of power that you've cost millions of dollars
and years to climb, that most people won't do. So you never get to
the courts for them, to actually get rid of this craziness that
shocks people. The fact that I wasn't allowed to come to some of
my hearings, the fact that the games the FTC plays when the
oversight committee finally started an investigation, and the
legislative affair offices doubling down, with Senators jumping. It
is appalling behavior, in the specifics.
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So what's it going to take to get someone to climb up that
mountain enough to actually get this thing turned over, at least,
and the details get put on the public?
JUSTICE DON WILLETT: Appalling and craziness. Does
that overstate it, or is that a G-rated description?
JACK BEERMANN: The interesting thing, of course, is if
you remember back in history, in 1980, there were rumblings
about the non-delegation doctrine. Of course, you know, if you
take my approach to Arlington, if there's a more sort of robust
either review of delegations or a more robust non-delegation
doctrine, you don't really have this problem so much, because the
agencies wouldn't have so much discretion, so there wouldn't be so
much to defer to. In 1980, it seemed like sort of more stringent
judicial review of what statutes said, in order to make sure there
wasn't too much of a delegation, seemed like a good idea.
Suddenly, in 1984, it seemed like deference was a good idea. What
changed between 1980 and 1984?
[Laughter.]
JACK BEERMANN: I think there was a deregulatory
President who came into power in 1981, and suddenly deference to
agencies seemed like a good idea. Well, after six years of the
Obama administration, maybe it doesn't seem like such a great
idea anymore. It may seem like a good idea in a couple of years,
but I sort of doubt it, based on the demographics of the Electoral
College.
So, really, I know that my colleague, Gary Lawson, said that
even at the beginning there were some people among The
Federalist Society that were concerned about Chevron, that it was
too deferential to agencies. I agree that it's fundamentally wrong
for courts to be that deferential to what agencies are doing, and
the biggest reason I think it's fundamentally wrong is because the
APA says that they're supposed to engage in judicial review under
the arbitrary, capricious standard, and they should be. It
encourages lazy behavior by agencies, who can ignore what
Congress says, because they figure they might get away with it,
and it encourages laziness and sloppy behavior by judges, and at
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the lower court level, they can just rid of cases. It's a little bit like
the administrative law equivalent of non-exhaustion of your
habeas remedies, on the criminal side. It's a way to get rid of a lot
of cases without having to really engage in the hard questions
about what does the statute really mean.
So I tend to agree with you, even though I don't share, I
think, your approach to how much regulation we ought to have. I
think whether it's a deregulatory regime or a regulatory regime, it
never seemed right to me.
THOMAS MERRILL: One thing that's struck me lately is,
we've been talking about questions of law and who should be
deciding questions of law, but I think for a lot of people, that's less
important than getting the facts correct. You can go way back to
the early twentieth century, and federal judges decided that
reviewing fact-finding by agencies was something that they were
too busy to do, and so they developed this kind of substantial
evidence standard of review of fact-finding by agencies, which
essentially meant that anything that the agency did got rubberstamped as long as they had some smidgeon of evidence in support
of what they were doing. And only later with Chevron, we started
debating about whether or not courts should defer to agencies on
questions of law.
But I think for many people, the greater injustice is the
agency's manipulation of the facts, and the fact that you can't
really go to federal court-one thing courts are good at is factfinding. I'm not so sure they're good at policymaking, but they're
pretty good at fact-finding. And I think the hands-off approach to
that may have contributed a lot to frustration.
JUSTICE DON WILLETT: And a final word? No? All right.
I want to thank our panel. This has been lively. Thank you.
[Applause.]
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